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prospectively reinstated memory 
drives conscious access of matching 
visual input
surya Gayet  1, Dirk van Moorselaar2,3, Christian N. L. olivers  3, Chris L. e. Paffen4 & 
stefan Van der stigchel4
Maintaining information in visual working memory (VWM) biases attentional selection of concurrent 
visual input, by favoring VWM-matching over VWM-mismatching visual input. Recently, it was shown 
that this bias disappears when the same item is memorized on consecutive occasions (as memoranda 
presumably transit from VWM to long-term memory), but reemerges when observers anticipate to 
memorize a novel item on a subsequent trial. Here, we aimed to conceptually replicate and extend this 
intriguing finding, by investigating whether prospectively reinstated memory drives conscious access 
of memory-matching visual input. We measured the time it took for participants to detect interocularly 
suppressed target stimuli, which were either from the same color category as a concurrently memorized 
color or not. our results showed that the advantage of memory-matching targets in overcoming 
suppression progresses non-monotonically across consecutive memorizations of the same color 
(‘repetitions’): the advantage for memory-matching visual input initially declined to asymptote, before 
being fully revived on the last repetition. this revival was not observed in a control experiment in 
which targets were not interocularly suppressed. the results suggest that, as observers anticipate to 
memorize a novel item imminently, VWM usage is prospectively reinstated, causing memory-matching 
visual input to gain accelerated access to consciousness again.
Visual working memory (VWM) is used to keep behaviorally relevant visual information available after ter-
mination of its retinal input. Oftentimes, the visual system has to process incoming visual input while at the 
same time maintaining previous visual input in VWM. These mnemonic and perceptual processes do not oper-
ate independently but rather cause preferential processing of visual input that matches the content of VWM1–4. 
Accordingly, it has been shown that, compared to memory-mismatching visual input, memory-matching visual 
input automatically attracts more attention5–7, automatically attracts more eye movements7–11, and is favored in 
bistable perception12,13. In addition, VWM appears to impact the processing of concurrent visual input at very 
early levels of visual processing, as perceptually suppressed visual input was shown to gain accelerated access to 
consciousness when it matches rather than mismatches the concurrent content of VWM14–17.
It goes without saying that VWM is not the only memory system at our disposal. With active learning 
through repeated memorization, memoranda presumably transit from VWM to long-term memory (LTM), as 
the neural mechanisms change from being activity-based18 to being plasticity-based19–22. Indeed, studies using 
electro-encephalography revealed that repeating the same memory item on a couple of successive trials suffices for 
the neural signature of VWM maintenance - the contralateral delay activity - to drop to asymptote, while the P170 
amplitude – a signature of LTM usage – climbs to peak level23–25. Furthermore, Van Moorselaar, Theeuwes, and 
Olivers26 found that across repeated memorizations of the same item, attentional capture by memory-matching 
distractors decreases. This is in line with the idea that as memoranda are preserved in a less activity-based state, 
they influence concurrent visual processing to a lesser extent. Surprisingly, however, Van Moorselaar and col-
leagues26 also observed that memory-matching visual input started to capture attention again towards the end 
of a repetition sequence, just before observers had to memorize a new item on the next trial. When memory 
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sequences were separated by an unrelated task (which did not involve memorizing a novel item), however, this 
memory-driven capture effect did not reemerge at the end of a sequence. The authors argued that, at the end of 
a sequence, observers anticipated to update the current memorandum with a new memory item, thereby caus-
ing the incidental reactivation of its representation in VWM. In line with this view, the data of Carlisle and 
colleagues25 (Figure 4D) also showed a numerical increase in the contralateral delay activity toward the end of a 
repetition sequence (although not formally tested).
In the present study, we sought to investigate whether prospectively reinstated VWM could favor conscious 
access of memory-matching visual input. Observing this would extend the finding of van Moorselaar and col-
leagues26 in two important ways. First, this would provide a conceptual replication (i.e., using a different probing 
method) of the surprising finding that VWM usage is reinstated when observers anticipate to memorize a novel 
item imminently. Second, this would demonstrate that prospectively reinstated VWM affects visual processing 
pre-consciously, as it co-determines the time-point of conscious detection. Thus, we hypothesized that the advan-
tage of memory-matching (relative to memory-mismatching) visual input in gaining conscious access would 
progress non-monotonically over consecutive repetitions: this memory-contingent bias is expected to initially 
decline, as memory representations become less active with learning, and to be reinstated toward the end of a 
repetition streak, as observers anticipate to memorize a novel item imminently. Alternatively, this memory-driven 
bias could decrease monotonically, showing that prospectively reinstated memory does not affect conscious 
access.
Figure 1 illustrates the procedure. On each trial, a retro cue instructed participants to memorize one out of two 
presented colors, such that one color was memorized and the other was discarded. During the retention inter-
val, participants performed a breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS) task, in which they were required 
to report the location of an initially suppressed target as soon as they could discern its location (left or right of 
fixation). The b-CFS technique makes use of the fact that a target presented to one eye is initially suppressed by 
a dynamic masking pattern presented to the other eye (i.e., continuous flash suppression, or CFS)27. Eventually, 
the target overcomes the interocular suppression, and reaches conscious access. The time it takes for observers to 
report the initially suppressed target reflects the propensity of that target to gain conscious access and is therefore 
a proxy of the strength of the pre-conscious representation28–30. The color of the target was either drawn from the 
same color category as the memorized color (i.e., a memory-matching target), or was drawn from the same color 
category as the discarded color (i.e., a memory-mismatching target). Critically, participants were cued to memo-
rize the same memory item for six consecutive trials. Existing evidence indicates that it suffices to memorize the 
same item on two or three successive trials to considerably reduce demands on the working memory system24–26. 
Response times to memory-matching and memory-mismatching targets were compared for each of the six repeti-
tions, allowing us to investigate the progression of the memory-driven bias in conscious access during the waxing 










Experiment 2 (monocular control)
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of a trial in which the target matches the color category of the to-be-memorized 
item. On each trial, participants were sequentially presented with two consecutive memory items – drawn 
from a different color category – and a retro cue (“1” or “2”), indicating which item they should memorize for a 
subsequent recognition task. During the retention interval, participants were required to report the location (left 
or right of fixation) of a target that was either interocularly suppressed (Experiment 1) or not (Experiment 2). 
The target could either match the cued (i.e., memorized) memory item, or the non-cued (i.e., discarded) memory 
item. Critically, throughout the entire experiment, participants were required to memorize the exact same 
memory item during six consecutive trials (i.e., repetitions).
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This experimental setup provides two crucial assets for addressing our research question. Firstly, using b-CFS 
allows for isolating modulations of memory contents on visual processes that precede conscious access, from 
modulations of memory contents on visual processes that arise after conscious access. This is done by assess-
ing the memory-driven response time benefit both for targets that are interocularly suppressed (as we do in 
Experiment 1), and for targets that are not (as we do in Experiment 2). This is important, as it allows for dissoci-
ating between perceptually driven influences of VWM maintenance on concurrent visual processing (i.e., caused 
by interaction with the mnemonic representation itself), from non-perceptual processes that are initiated after 
stimulus detection (i.e., driven by control processes; see General Discussion). Secondly, the current approach, 
in which the same item is memorized on consecutive trials, allows for varying VWM usage, while keeping both 
the task-instructions and the physical stimulation identical. Under these circumstances, a non-monotonic pro-
gression of the memory-driven bias in conscious access (i.e., initially waning before being reinstated in the last 
repetition) would provide evidence that prospectively reinstated memory drives conscious access of matching 
visual input.
Methods
participants. Based on an optional Bayesian stopping rule (see the paragraph ‘stopping rule’), data of 36 
participants were collected for Experiment 1 (12 males, with an average age of 21 years; SD = 1.9). This number of 
participants was then matched for Experiment 2 by collecting data from 36 new participants (13 males, with an 
average age of 22 years; SD = 1.7). The participant group consisted of undergraduate students recruited at Utrecht 
University. Participants provided informed consent before participating, and were compensated with either 
course credits or monetary reward upon completion of the experiment. The study was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Utrecht University, and all methods were performed in accordance 
with the ethical committee’s guidelines and regulations. All participants had (corrected-to) normal vision, and 
were tested for color blindness with the Ishihara color blindness test plates31, and tested for stereoscopic vision 
with the TNO test for stereoscopic vision32.
stimuli and apparatus. Participants were seated in front of a mirror stereoscope mounted on a chinrest, 
which ensured separate stimulation of the two eyes, at an effective viewing distance of 57 cm to a linearized CRT 
monitor (22″ LaCie Electron Blue IV, 1024 by 768 pixels). Responses were collected using the arrow keys of an 
Apple keyboard, and the temporal resolution of response time registration was limited by the refresh rate of the 
monitor (100 Hz). In order to promote binocular fusion of the complementary images, identical Brownian noise 
frames were presented to both eyes, delimiting the gray presentation area on which all stimuli were presented. The 
presentation area consisted of a circular region with a diameter of 4.5 degrees of visual angle (dva). At all times, 
a black (<0.1 Cd/m2; 0.2 dva) and white (32 Cd/m2; 0.1 dva) fixation bullseye was presented at the center of the 
presentation areas.
The memory items used for the memory task, and the target stimuli used for the b-CFS task, consisted of 
colored disks with a diameter of 0.6 dva. The memory items were centrally presented, and had a mean luminance 
of 3.35 Cd/m2. They were retrieved from one of our earlier studies16, but were extended from four to five colors 
per category (see Table 1), so that each color would be used fewer times throughout the experiment. In addition, 
a separate b-CFS pilot study (N = 8) was used to adaptively adjust the luminance output of the red, green, and 
purple target stimuli, until they elicited comparable detection times as the blue reference stimulus on our set-up. 
Finally, the luminance of the gray background was chosen such as to match the average luminance of the target 
stimuli, so that the target stimuli were primarily defined by their chromatic contrast rather than their luminance 
contrast with the background. Target stimuli were increased from 0 to 100% opacity (i.e., linear addition of target 
stimulus and background contribution) in one second, and were presented at a fixed eccentricity of 2.25 dva, left 
or right of fixation, randomly jittered within 30 degrees of the horizontal midline. The retro-cues – indicating 
which of two successively presented memory items should be memorized for a subsequent recognition task – 
consisted of the Arabic numerals “1” or “2” written in a black Arial font (0.6 dva).
The masks used for eliciting CFS were created by filtering pink (1/f) noise using a rotationally symmetric 
Gaussian low-pass filter (σ = 3.5) and making the resulting image binary (black and white, >99% Michelson 
contrast). The same masks were used in earlier studies from our labs14,16,17. On every trial, 20 new masks were 
generated, which were presented for 100 ms each (10 Hz) in random order, with the restriction that the same mask 
was never presented twice in succession.
experimental procedure. Before the experiment was initiated, participants performed a standard b-CFS 
task (with saturated blue disks as target stimuli) in order to determine eye-dominance within the b-CFS par-
adigm. Throughout the rest of the Experiment, the target was presented to the non-dominant eye (in both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2). The CFS masks were presented to the other eye in Experiment 1 (thereby elic-
iting interocular suppression), and to the same eye as the target in Experiment 2 (thereby eliciting no interocular 
suppression). Next, participants performed 18 practice trials to get acquainted with the experiment. Finally, the 
experiment was initiated, constituting of 192 trials divided into 12 blocks of 3 minutes each.
The sequence of events in a trial is depicted in Fig. 1. Each trial started with a blank (i.e., the gray presentation 
area with a black-white fixation bulls-eye, for 1000 ms), a central disk with a color drawn from one of the four 
color categories (800 ms), a blank (800 ms), a central disk with a color from the complementary color category 
(800 ms), a blank (800 ms), and the number “1” or “2” (800 ms), which instructed participants to memorize either 
the first or the second stimulus. After another blank (1600 ms), the CFS masks were presented at 10 Hz and, after 
a variable delay ranging between 300 and 600 ms, the target was gradually increased from zero to full opacity over 
the course of one second. The presentation of target and dynamic masks was continued for a maximum of five 
seconds, or until participants provided a response. Participants were instructed to report as fast and accurately 
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as possible on which hemifield (i.e., left or right of fixation) the target appeared. Next, three more masks were 
presented dichoptically (300 ms) to eliminate after images, followed by a blank (800 ms), after which two colored 
discs were presented for the recognition task: one disc was of the exact same color as the cued memory item, and 
the other disc was of a different color (but of the same color category). Participants were required to provide a 
non-speeded report as to which of these two colors was identical to the one they were cued to memorize before.
experimental design. The experimental design for both experiments comprised two within-subject factors 
of interest: the factor Repetition with six levels, (repetition one to six) and the factor Congruence with two levels 
(the target matches the color of the memorized or of the discarded memory item). All combinations of these fac-
tor levels were equally prevalent within each experimental block. Within-subject factors of non-interest that were 
fully counterbalanced with the factors of interest included the color category of the cued memory item (red, blue, 
green, or purple), the retro-cue (“1” or “2”), and the hemifield on which the target was presented (left or right of 
fixation). Within-subject factors of non-interest that were not counterbalanced (but for which equal prevalence 
was maximally approximated) included the exact hue of the cued memory item (one of five), the exact hue of the 
discarded memory item (one of five), the exact location of the target stimulus (i.e., one of 12 angular positions 
per hemifield), the location of the correct response during the recognition task (left or right), and the exact hue of 
the distractor during the recognition task (one of the remaining four hues within the color category of the cued 
memory item).
A critical aspect of the current experimental paradigm is that the experiment was subdivided into sequences 
of six consecutive trials (i.e., repetitions) in which the same memory item was cued for memorization. The item 
that was not cued for memorization was also of the exact same hue across the six repetitions, but all other factors 
were varied (i.e., the target location, the retro-cue, target congruence, and the hue and location of the distractor 
during the memory task). Repeating the discarded memory item across repetitions as well, allowed for isolating 
the influence of repeated memorization (which only occurs for the to-be-memorized item) from repeated stimu-





Red 1 0.595 0.363 3.84
Red 2 0.619 0.349 3.54
Red 3 0.651 0.338 3.75
Red 4 0.570 0.315 3.47
Red 5 0.582 0.326 3.15
Average (SD) 0.603 (0.032) 0.338 (0.018) 3.55 (0.27)
Green 1 0.270 0.529 3.22
Green 2 0.281 0.596 3.43
Green 3 0.292 0.608 3.69
Green 4 0.307 0.584 3.14
Green 5 0.328 0.555 2.99
Average (SD) 0.296 (0.023) 0.574 (0.032) 3.29 (0.27)
Blue 1 0.165 0.135 3.44
Blue 2 0.159 0.106 3.35
Blue 3 0.147 0.121 3.50
Blue 4 0.152 0.080 2.86
Blue 5 0.171 0.092 3.15
Average (SD) 0.159 (0.010) 0.107 (0.022) 3.26 (0.26)
Purple 1 0.226 0.123 3.41
Purple 2 0.249 0.133 3.28
Purple 3 0.271 0.141 3.28
Purple 4 0.292 0.152 3.39
Purple 5 0.284 0.184 3.15
Average (SD) 0.264 (0.027) 0.145 (0.023) 3.30 (0.10)
Red target 0.608 0.341 3.83
Green target 0.293 0.579 4.15
Blue target 0.157 0.102 2.86
Purple target 0.263 0.150 3.71
Gray background 0.311 0.329 3.63
Table 1. Overview of the stimulus colors (CIE values*) used in Experiments 1 and 2. *CIE values stands for 
Commission Internationale d’Eclairage values, as measured from viewing distance (i.e., 57 cm) with a PR-650 
SpectraScan colorimeter/telephotometer (Photo Research, Inc.).
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Color categories were paired, so that when a red memory item was cued, the non-cued (i.e., discarded) item 
was always of the blue color category (and vice versa), and when a green memory item was cued, the non-cued 
item was always of the purple color category (and vice versa). This was done to reduce the number of conditions, 
and to avoid spurious categorizations between purple, red, and blue color variations. All trials were presented 
in a pseudo-randomized order, with the only restriction that participants were never cued to memorize an item 
from the same color category in successive series of repetitions. This was done to ensure that memory items on 
the first repetition were always clearly dissociable from the previously memorized item (i.e., the last repetition of 
the previous series of six consecutive trials). Participants were not informed about the occurrence (or number) of 
memory repetitions in the experiment.
Monocular control (Experiment 2). Response times to interocularly suppressed targets are composed 
of (1) the duration of interocular suppression, and (2) the response speed after the interocular suppression is 
resolved. Experiment 2 was aimed at assessing whether (in Experiment 1) the memory content genuinely affected 
interocular suppression durations, or whether the memory content elicited differences in response speed aris-
ing after the interocular suppression was resolved (or both). For this purpose, the target and masks were now 
presented to the same eye, so that no interocular suppression was induced. The rationale behind this so-called 
monocular control experiment is that any influence of (in this case) memory content on interocular suppression 
durations should be abolished (as there is no interocular suppression), but any influence of memory content 
on processes that arose after the interocular conflict was resolved, should be preserved (this approach has been 
extensively discussed in the literature29,30,33).
It should be noted that the current implementation of the monocular control condition does not fully follow 
the guidelines set out by Gayet et al.30, in which (1) we argued in favor of intermixing interocular suppression 
trials and monocular control trials, and (2) we advocated the usage of two monocular control conditions: one 
that matches the stimulus timing, and one that matches the response times of the interocular suppression con-
dition. We refrained from choosing this optimal set-up in light of two considerations. Firstly, this would lead to 
a three-fold increase in the number of trials per participant, and thereby to overlearning of the different hues 
that were used for the memory task. This is potentially problematic, as overlearning of memory items might 
reduce participants’ need to rely on VWM storage for performing the delayed match-to-sample task. Secondly, 
we deemed it unnecessary to employ this optimal set-up, because our main goal was not to demonstrate whether 
or not memory maintenance affects processing of visual input prior to conscious access per se (this has already 
been established in earlier work13,17,34), but to investigate whether the influence of memory maintenance on 
the processing of concurrent visual input varies with learning, as observers are repeatedly exposed to the same 
memorandum.
stopping rule. In order to ascertain sufficient experimental sensitivity, we used an optional Bayesian stop-
ping rule: we decided a priori that we would test until a Bayes Factor of 6 was observed for both the first and last 
repetitions, in favor of either the null hypothesis (i.e., no influence of VWM on response times, BF+0  < 16 ), or the alternative hypothesis (i.e., faster response times to memory-matching targets, BF+0 > 6), with a minimum of 20 
participants. Bayes Factors were computed in JASP35, using the standard Cauchy prior width of 0.707. Because, to 
the best of our knowledge, all behavioral effects of VWM contents on concurrent visual input reported in the lit-
erature reflect a bias towards memory-matching visual input, we opted for directional Bayesian tests. In order to 
maintain comparable experimental power between experiments, we based the number of participants in 
Experiment 2 on the number of participants obtained through the stopping rule in Experiment 1, thereby allow-
ing us to conduct additional explorative between-group analyses.
Data analyses. The critical comparisons consisted of the differences in response times between 
memory-matching and memory-mismatching targets, for each of the six repetitions. Any difference that is 
observed between these conditions can only be explained by memory-based modulations of the concurrent 
visual input. This follows from the fact that, across all trials, matching and mismatching trials elicit the exact 
same visual input, and the exact same memory content, but only differ in terms of the contingency between the 
memory content and visual input. Part of the variance in response time difference between these conditions can 
be explained by individual differences in absolute response times33, which is of no interest for the current research 
question. To remove this variance of non-interest, we conducted statistics on latency-normalized response time 
differences between memory-matching and memory-mismatching conditions. This metric is obtained by divid-
ing the median response time difference between the memory-matching and memory-mismatching conditions, 
by the averaged median response times in the memory-matching and memory-mismatching conditions. Thus, 
the latency-normalized response time difference describes by what fraction response times to a target are reduced 
when it matched rather than mismatched the concurrent memory content. This normalization procedure has the 
additional advantage of yielding a pattern of response time differences that more closely approximates a normal 
distribution33, so that parametric tests can be applied. Shapiro-Wilkinson tests of normality confirmed that the 
assumption of normality was not violated in any of the repetition conditions after latency-normalization (all 
p’s > 0.05). For all tests, a Bayes factor above 3 for either the null or the alternative hypothesis was regarded as 
substantial evidence in favor of that hypothesis36–38.
The Bayesian t-tests on the RT difference between memory-matching and memory-mismatching targets 
were not corrected for multiple comparisons across the different repetitions of the same memorandum. This fol-
lows three main considerations. First, Bayes factors are based on posterior odds, which reflect the belief in one’s 
hypotheses after having observed the data (i.e., the extent to which the data more closely resembles what the data 
would have looked like under hypothesis A or under hypothesis B). The interpretation of Bayes factors is therefore 
unaffected by the number of statistical tests that are conducted39–41. Second, the data in consecutive repetitions 
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are not independent; if anything, consecutive repetitions with a relatively feeble effect in the same direction, pro-
vide stronger (rather than weaker) evidence for that effect. Third, we formulated clear predictions regarding the 
progression of the memory-based bias in conscious access across repetitions (i.e., non-monotonic, monotonic, or 
flat progression). Aside from the Bayesian t-tests on each repetition, these predictions were also explicitly pitted 
against one another by comparing regression models that best fit the pattern of observed data.
Results
Experiment 1 (interocular suppression). First, we aimed to assess whether we could replicate Gayet 
et al.’s13 findings that the location of initially interocularly suppressed targets can be reported faster when they 
match compared to when they mismatch the concurrent memory content, irrespective of (i.e., collapsed over) the 
repetition of memory items. A directional Bayesian paired-samples t-test revealed that it was 32 times more likely 
that the observed data reflected faster response times for memory-matching relative to memory-mismatching tar-
gets, than reflecting equal response times for both, BF+0 = 32.3. Overall, observers were 4.2% faster on memory- 
matching than on memory-mismatching trials (SD = 7.7%; corresponding to 61 ms).
Next, we separately investigated the decrease in response times for memory-matching targets on each succes-
sive repetition of the same memory item, using directional Bayesian t-tests (see Fig. 2, Panel a). On the first repe-
tition, memory-matching targets were responded to 7.9% (SD = 18.5%) faster than memory-mismatching targets 
(corresponding to 128 ms), BF+0 = 6.2. The second and third repetitions yielded insufficient evidence to either 
support or refute a difference in response times between memory-matching and memory-mismatching targets, 
1
3
 < BF+0 < 3 (28 ms and 41 ms faster response to memory-matching targets respectively). On the fourth repeti-
tion, substantial evidence was observed in favor of the null hypothesis, BF0+  = 4.0, showing that the difference in 
response times between memory-matching and memory-mismatching trials had vanished (1 ms faster response 
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1 (black) and Experiment 2 (gray). Panels (a,b) depict the raw response 
times to the target presented during the retention interval, depending on whether it matched (i.e., memorized 
condition; solid line) or mismatched (i.e., discarded condition; dashed line) the color category of the memorized 
item. Bayesian support for the null (o) or alternative hypothesis (+) is provided for each repetition is provided 
directly above the corresponding label on the x-axis. Panel (c) depicts the percentage decrease in response time 
to memory-matching (memorized condition) relative to memory-mismatching (discarded condition) targets. 
Panel (d) depicts participants’ recognition accuracy on the recognition task following the retention interval. The 
goodness of fit of different regression models was compared using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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to memory-matching targets). The fifth repetition again yielded insufficient evidence to either support or refute a 
difference in response times between memory-matching and memory-mismatching targets, 1
3
 < BF+0 < 3 (75 ms 
faster response to memory-matching targets). Crucially, the influence of memory content on response times was 
revived on the sixth repetition, as memory-matching targets were again responded to 7.1% (SD = 15.0%) faster 
than memory-mismatching targets (corresponding to 94 ms), BF+0 = 10.8. As such, the memory-driven bias in 
conscious access of matching visual input initially diminished across early repetitions, but was reinstated on the 
last repetition as observers could anticipate to memorize a novel item on the subsequent trial.
In order to test whether the progression of response time differences across successive repetitions is indeed 
best explained by a U-curve, we fitted monotonic (linear, exponential) and non-monotonic (quadratic, cubic) 
regression models to the latency-normalized response time differences across repetitions. Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) values were used to compare the goodness of fit (with lower numbers representing better fit), 
while penalizing for the number of included parameters42,43. The left column of Table 2 shows that the quadratic 
regression (closely followed by the cubic regression) best describes the data, clearly outperforming the two mono-
tonic regression models. We next assessed the relative likelihood of one model over another (e.g., RLM1>M2) to 
minimize information loss, following the equation: =>
. −⁎RL eMM1 2
0 5 (AIC AIC )M M2 1 . This showed that the quadratic 
regression model was 299 times more probable to minimize information loss than the exponential regression 
model, and 812 times more probable to minimize information loss than the linear regression model (see Fig. 2, 
Panel c). This comparison of regression models corroborates the findings obtained with Bayesian t-tests, 
described earlier, and further establishes that the memory-driven bias in conscious access initially declined before 
reemerging toward the end of a repetition streak.
Experiment 2 (monocular control). Experiment 2 was aimed to assess whether the prospective rein-
statement of the memory-driven bias in Experiment 1 actually reflected processes that occur before or after the 
interocular conflict is resolved. Again, we first investigated whether response times to memory-matching and 
memory-mismatching targets differed, with response times collapsed across repetitions. Subsequently, response 
time to memory-matching and memory-mismatching targets were compared for each repetition separately.
In contrast to earlier findings (e.g., Experiments 2 and 3 of Gayet et al.13; but see Experiment 1B of Van 
Moorselaar et al.17) we observed a small but robust effect of memory content on response times in the monoc-
ular control experiment. A directional Bayesian paired-samples t-test revealed that it was 6 times more likely 
that the observed data reflected faster response times for memory-matching compared to memory-mismatching 
targets, than reflecting equal response times for both, BF+0 = 5.8. Overall, observers were 1.0% faster on 
memory-matching than on memory-mismatching trials (SD = 2.2%; corresponding to 11 ms). A Bayesian 
independent-samples t-test between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 provided substantial evidence that the 
impact of memory content on response times is more pronounced in the case of interocular suppression than 
in the absence of interocular suppression (61 ms or 7.7%, compared to 11 ms or 1.0%), BF+0 = 6.2. This suggests 
that, across all repetitions, memory contents affect processes that emerge after the interocular conflict is resolved 
(Experiment 2), as well as interocular suppression durations (Experiment 1).
In order to investigate how the influence of memory content on detection times evolved over successive repe-
titions, we conducted directional Bayesian paired-samples t-tests for each of the six repetitions (see Fig. 2, panel 
b). This revealed that, on the first repetition, memory-matching targets were responded to 3.4% (SD = 5.8%) 
faster than memory-mismatching targets (corresponding to 36 ms), BF+0 = 51.8. The second and third repetitions 
yielded insufficient evidence to either support or refute a difference in response times between memory-matching 
and memory-mismatching targets, 1
3
 < BF+0 < 3 (11 ms and 14 ms faster response time to memory-matching tar-
gets respectively). On the fourth, fifth, and sixth repetition, the data provided substantial evidence for the null 
hypothesis that response times to memory-matching and memory-mismatching targets did not differ; BF0+  = 7.6, 
BF0+  = 4.3, and BF0+  = 4.5 respectively (1 ms, 2 ms, and 6 ms faster response time to memory-matching targets 
respectively). As such, memory-matching targets were reported faster than memory-mismatching targets on the 
first repetition, even in the absence of interocular suppression. In contrast to Experiment 1 in which targets were 
interocularly suppressed, however, this effect was not revived on the last repetition in the absence of interocular 
suppression.
To further investigate this qualitative difference between experiments, we conducted Bayesian independent-samples 
t-test to assess whether the memory content affected response times differently in the presence (Experiment 1) or 
absence (Experiment 2) of interocular suppression. These tests revealed that the evidence for a difference between 
Experiments 1 and 2 was inconclusive for repetitions one to five (i.e., 1
3
 < BF+0 < 3), but on the last repetition the mem-
ory content impacted response times to a greater extent in the presence (7.1%, SD = 15.0%; corresponding to 94 ms) 
Fit










Linear 34.0 30.8 19.7 36.1
Exponential 32.0 14.8* 11.6* 23.5*
Non-monotonic
Quadratic 20.6* 22.6 14.2 25.9
Cubic 22.4 19.5 15.6 26.4
Table 2. Akaike criterion values for the goodness of fit of (non-)monotonic regression models. Note. Asterisks 
denote the regression model that best fits the observed data.
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than in the absence (0.3%, SD = 7.0; corresponding to 6 ms) of interocular suppression, BF+0 = 6.1. A comparison of 
regression models on the data of Experiment 2 (see Table 2) confirmed that the observed difference in response times 
between memory-matching and memory-mismatching conditions in the absence of interocular suppression is best 
described as a monotonic (exponential) decrease over successive repetitions. Computing the relative likelihoods of 
pairs of models revealed that the exponential regression model was 4 times more probable to minimize information 
loss than the quadratic regression model, and 7 times more probable to minimize information loss than the cubic 
regression model (see Fig. 2, Panel c). Taking together the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, these data demonstrate that 
prospectively reinstated VWM maintenance effectively reduced the suppression duration (and thus enhanced con-
scious access) of matching visual input.
Recognition task (Experiments 1 and 2). The main purpose of analyzing participants’ performance on 
the recognition task was to verify whether they performed above chance level, thereby establishing that they 
complied with the task demands (i.e., memorizing the cued memory item). This was analyzed using a directional 
Bayesian one-sample t-test against the 50% chance level. Collapsed over all six repetitions, participants were 
85.8% (SD = 5.5) accurate in reporting which color they had been cued to memorize on that trial in Experiment 
1, which is higher than the 50% chance level, BF+0 = 1.8*1027. Similarly, in Experiment 2, participants were 82.4% 
(SD = 6.7) accurate in reporting which color they had been cued to memorize on that trial, which is higher than 
the 50% chance level, BF+0 = 1.3*1023. A Bayesian independent-samples t-test revealed that the difference in 
memory recognition accuracy between Experiments 1 and 2 was statistically unreliable, 1
3
 < BF+0 < 3.
A secondary purpose of analyzing performance on the recognition task was to establish that task performance 
on the recognition task increased monotonically across repetitions. This is important, because, if performance on 
the recognition task follows the same non-monotonic pattern as the response time differences analyzed above, 
then task difficulty (on the recognition task) rather than VWM usage could have caused response times differ-
ences to vary across repetitions. This was not the case: For Experiments 1 and 2, an exponential regression fit best 
explained the increase in performance on the recognition task over successive repetitions of the same memory 
item. A comparison of AIC values for the different regression models is provided in Table 2, and the winning 
regression fit is depicted in Fig. 2 (Panel d). Specifically, the exponential regression models (for Experiments 1 and 
2 respectively) were 49 and 3 times more probable to minimize information loss than the quadratic model, and 10 
and 4 times more probable to minimize information loss than the cubic model. Considering that VWM perfor-
mance increases monotonically across repetitions, it can account for the waning of the memory-driven bias across 
repetitions in Experiment 2, where targets were not interocularly suppressed. In contrast, VWM performance 
cannot account for the non-monotonic progression of VWM influence on concurrent visual input, as observed in 
Experiment 1, where targets were interocularly suppressed. Hence, the reemergence of the memory-driven bias 
in conscious access is caused by a change in VWM usage, rather than VWM precision.
Target localization task (Experiments 1 and 2). The performance on the left/right target location dis-
crimination task was 98.2% (SD = 2.7) in Experiment 1, and 99.3% (SD = 1.0) in Experiment 2. Performance on 
the target localization task did not reliably differ between experiments, as evidenced by a non-directional 
independent-samples Bayesian t-test, 1
3
 < BF+0 < 3.
Discussion
Previous studies showed that visual input gains accelerated conscious access when it matches the concurrent 
memory content14–17. Here, we instructed participants to memorize the same item in series of six consecutive 
trials (repetitions), to investigate how repeated memorization would affect this memory-driven bias in conscious 
access. To summarize our results: At the first presentation of a memorandum (repetition one), we found an 
advantage for reporting memory-matching over memory-mismatching targets in both the interocular suppres-
sion experiment and the monocular control experiment, and the statistical test was inconclusive as to whether 
or not there was a difference between experiments. As such, we cannot assert whether this effect was brought 
about before or after the interocular competition was resolved (or both). From repetitions two to five, there was 
no influence of the memoranda on response times (and thus on conscious access) at all, neither before nor after 
the interocular competition was resolved. At the end of a sequence (repetition six), the advantage for reporting 
memory-matching targets reemerged in the interocular suppression experiment, thus providing a conceptual 
replication of the rebound effect recently observed by Moorselaar and colleagues26. Surprisingly, this reemer-
gence was not observed in the monocular control experiment. Substantial evidence for the null hypothesis in this 
experiment (no difference between memory-matching and memory-mismatching targets) thus demonstrates that 
the reemergence observed in the interocular suppression experiment is indeed specific for interocular suppres-
sion (all other things between Experiments 1 and 2 being equal). Consequently, we conclude that prospectively 
reinstated memory drives conscious access of memory-matching visual input. This pattern of findings suggests 
that VWM activity was reinstated when observers anticipated to memorize a novel item on the subsequent trial, 
causing the preferential conscious access of memory-matching visual input to reemerge.
The present findings are in line with those of van Moorselaar and colleagues26, who demonstrated that the 
influence of memory maintenance on attentional capture was revived when observers planned to memorize a 
novel item on the subsequent trial. Our current work adds to the findings of Van Moorselaar et al.26 in two 
main ways. Firstly, we extend these findings by showing that the reinstatement of this memory-driven bias was 
observed under conditions of interocular suppression (Experiment 1), but not in the absence of interocular sup-
pression (Experiment 2). As such, prospectively reinstated memory impacts visual input that is not yet con-
sciously accessible (this follows from the fact that memory affected the point in time at which the visual input 
became consciously accessible). This strongly suggests that the bias toward memory-matching visual input that 
reemerged toward the end of a repetition streak is perceptual in nature (e.g., driven by reinstatement of VWM 
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activity), rather than reflecting a response bias (which should have affected response times in the monocular 
Experiment 2 as well). The present data thus corroborates the hypothesis formulated by Van Moorselaar et al.26: 
the anticipation of memorizing a novel item causes reinstatement of the VWM machinery, as a result of which the 
current memorandum is transferred back into an activity-based storage state, and interacts with the processing 
of concurrent visual input again (this is further elaborated below). Secondly, the current study provides a concep-
tual replication of the finding of Van Moorselaar et al.26. That is, we observe the prospective reinstatement of the 
memory-driven bias in a different paradigm, involving different visual stimulation, and a different response task. 
Also, in their study, the reinstatement occurred on either repetition 3 or repetition 9 (depending on which repeti-
tion was the last in that particular experiment), and in our study this occurred on repetition 6 (the last repetition 
in our design). In that regard, the current study adds to the evidence that the putative reinstatement of the VWM 
machinery is flexible and depends on the observer’s expectation of imminent VWM usage (i.e., to memorize a 
new color). While these latter points might seem trivial, we believe they are of utmost importance, considering 
that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and thus help to establish this intriguing finding.
The reinstatement of the memory-bias on the last repetition leaves to wonder why the anticipation of mem-
orizing a novel item would cause the current memorandum to influence concurrent perception again. This is 
particularly striking, given that, after multiple repeated memorizations, memoranda no longer affect perception 
(as observed in our study) and no longer evoke contralateral delay activity23–25, and thus no longer seem to be rep-
resented in an activity-based VWM state. Surely, the anticipation of memorizing a novel item does not reinstate 
all items that observers have ever stored in LTM, as this would also include the non-cued (discarded) color, and a 
plethora of other unrelated (e.g., childhood) memories. Yet, the anticipation of memorizing a novel item did col-
laterally reinstate the current memorandum in a state that caused it to affect perception once again. This strongly 
suggests that, unlike other LTM content, information about the current memorandum was somehow preserved in 
VWM storage sites, but in a state that is not (as much) reflected in the delay activity, and did not affect perception. 
Such states have recently been shown to exist for so-called unattended memory items: these are memoranda that 
are preserved for later recall, but are sidelined by a cue indicating imminent recall of another memorandum44. An 
unattended memory item is not (or less) reflected in delay activity, but stimulus-specific delay activity represent-
ing the unattended memory item can be reinstated by stimulating the involved neural populations in a stimulus 
a-specific manner (i.e., ‘pinging the brain45). This suggests that some information about the unattended memory 
item was somehow retained in the VWM storage site, in an activity silent45 or dampened46 state. Considering the 
current study, it is conceivable that a memorandum requires gradually less attentional resources with repeated 
memorization (i.e., memory performance increases across repetitions), as a result of which delay activity decays, 
but a trace is preserved in VWM storage sites. In this scenario, the reactivation of VWM control mechanisms 
(for imminent memorization of a novel item) collaterally activates the VWM storage site in a stimulus-aspecific 
manner, thus coincidentally boosting the (stimulus-specific) representation of the memorandum, such that it 
once again biases concurrent perception. Future research should reveal whether, after repeated memorization of 
the same memorandum, some information about the memorandum is indeed preserved in VWM storage sites.
The discrepancy between Experiments 1 and 2 raises the question why prospectively reinstated memory 
would selectively affect visual input when it is interocularly suppressed. Could a difference in experimental sen-
sitivity between Experiments 1 and 2 cause a spurious difference between the two experiments? This relates to 
a current debate on the overall effectiveness of the monocular control condition in isolating post-suppression 
effects29,33. Considering that well-established effects (such as faster detection of upright compared to inverted 
faces) were sometimes not observed in monocular control conditions28,29, one could wonder whether the monoc-
ular control condition is suitable for uncovering post-suppression effects. Experimental insensitivity is unlikely 
to explain the current results, however, as the faster response times to memory-matching visual input on repe-
tition 1 was statistically more robust in Experiment 2 (without interocular suppression) than in Experiment 1 
(with interocular suppression). Therefore, if anything, the monocular control Experiment appears to be more 
sensitive in uncovering differences in response times between memory-matching and memory-mismatching 
visual input than the interocular suppression experiment. Additionally, the usage of Bayesian analyses further 
confirmed that the null effect on repetition 6 in Experiment 2 reflected genuine evidence for the absence of a 
difference in response times, rather than reflecting absence of evidence (i.e., experimental insensitivity). With 
the issue of experimental sensitivity now brushed aside, it is crucial to evaluate what we are exactly measuring in 
Experiments 1 and 2. In the monocular control experiment, in which no interocular suppression was induced, the 
advantage for reporting memory-matching over memory-mismatching targets could be driven by non-perceptual 
effects (e.g., a more liberal response tendency for reporting memory matching targets) or perceptual effects (e.g., 
increased perceptual sensitivity to memory-matching targets). Bearing in mind that Experiments 1 and 2 only 
differed in the occurrence of interocular suppression, any effect that influenced response times in the monocular 
control experiment, should similarly influence response times in the interocular suppression experiment (but 
after the interocular conflict is resolved, hence ‘post-suppression effects’). Conversely, effects that are observed 
in the interocular suppression experiment but not in the monocular control experiment reflect a difference in 
interocular suppression duration (hence ‘pre-suppression effects’): shorter interocular suppression durations for 
memory-matching visual input. On the last repetition, we observed that the pre-suppression effects were revived 
(this follows from the presence of an effect in Experiment 1, given a null effect in Experiment 2), but surprisingly 
the post-suppression effects were not (this follows from the null effect in Experiment 2). We can conceive of at 
least two distinct ways in which VWM content can enhance responses to matching visual input. Firstly, sensory 
representations (from visual input) could be enhanced when they match concurrent mnemonic representations 
(maintained in VWM), as they draw upon a shared neural substrate3,4,16,44–51, thus allowing for faster perceptual 
reports to memory-matching visual input. If it is indeed the case that the current memorandum is reinstated in 
an activity-based VWM state on the last repetition, the memory-driven bias toward memory-matching visual 
input is expected to reemerge on the last repetition (as was observed in the interocular suppression experiment). 
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Secondly, VWM maintenance could cause a decisional (i.e., post-suppression) bias toward memory-matching 
visual input, so that participants employ a more liberal response tendency for reporting upon memory-matching 
compared to memory-mismatching visual input. An interpretation of the current findings is that observers 
are more prone to such decisional biases toward memory-matching visual input, when memorization requires 
more effort, and thus more attentional resources were devoted to the memorandum. In line with this view, the 
memory-driven bias in the monocular control experiment decreased monotonically, while the performance on 
the memory recall task increased monotonically. In sum, the present paradigm potentially allows for reviving 
activity-based VWM storage, without reviving decisional biases that accompany effortful memory encoding. 
Future research is needed, however, to explicitly test whether the post-suppression component indeed co-varies 
with the amount of attentional resources allocated to VWM encoding, while the pre-suppression component 
depends on activity-based memory storage.
The present data also provided a conceptual replication of another important finding: the perceptual bias 
towards memory-matching visual input declines when the same item is repeatedly memorized. In our study, the 
response time benefit for memory-matching targets declined to asymptote over the course of the first handful of 
repetitions, in both the interocular suppression experiment (Experiment 1) and the monocular control experi-
ment (Experiment 2). Thus, after a handful of repetitions, there was no more influence of memory content on the 
processing of concurrent visual input. Because, the six repetitions were identical in terms of visual stimulation 
and task instructions, the only difference is the number of times that a particular item had been successively 
memorized, presumably causing the memorandum to transit from VWM to LTM storage21,22,25. As such, this 
finding shows that VWM maintenance is required (and LTM usage is not sufficient) for accelerating conscious 
access of memory-matching visual input. An alternative view, however, is that it is not VWM maintenance per se 
(in the form of delay activity), but task-relevance that causes accelerated conscious access of memory-matching 
visual input. That is, when using a memory-recall task, memory-matching and memory-mismatching targets 
differ in two ways: (1) the memory-matching target matches a concurrently memorized feature, and (2) the 
memory-matching target matches a feature that is relevant for an upcoming task. This distinction is important 
because, visual input that is behaviorally relevant to the observer can have an advantage in overcoming intero-
cular suppression, even in the absence of (explicit) memorization30. For instance, face stimuli with gaze directed 
toward the observer overcome interocular suppression faster than those with averted gaze52, and visual stimuli 
associated with reward overcome interocular suppression faster than stimuli that are neutral or that are associ-
ated with threat53–56. Similarly, a visual feature that is coincidentally relevant for a secondary task – performed in 
close temporal proximity – is more likely to overcome interocular suppression compared to a visual feature that is 
irrelevant for this secondary task57, even when no VWM maintenance is required. The present paradigms allows 
to dissociate between the roles of VWM retention and of behavioral relevance, because the relevance of the mem-
orized color category for the upcoming memory task remains unchanged across repetitions, while VWM usage 
varies23–25. Thus, the present data confirms earlier claims that VWM maintenance drives the accelerated conscious 
access of memory-matching visual input14–17, by demonstrating that behavioral relevance of the memorized fea-
ture category alone cannot explain memory-driven biases in conscious access.
Perhaps surprisingly, the faster response times to memory-matching relative to mismatching targets on the 
first presentation of a memorandum (Repetition 1), was observed not only in the interocular suppression experi-
ment (Experiment 1) but also in the monocular control experiment (Experiment 2). As such, we cannot conclude 
from the present data alone whether the response-time benefit for memory-matching targets on Repetition 1 was 
caused by (A) reduced suppression durations for memory-matching targets, or whether (B) this difference was 
initiated after the targets were released from suppression. In general, comparing the magnitude of response time 
differences between conditions with and conditions without interocular suppression is problematic, because of 
the inherent differences in visual stimulation and perceptual experience between the two conditions29,33. As such, 
the current study was not set-up to detect such a difference between experiments. Rather, we were interested in 
qualitative differences between said conditions across memory repetitions. The data revealed such a qualitative 
difference across memory repetitions: response time benefits for memory-matching targets decreased monoton-
ically in the Experiment without interocular suppression, and progressed non-monotonically in the Experiment 
with interocular suppression, in which a ‘rebound effect’ was observed.
Conclusion
In this study, we investigated how repeated memorization affects the advantage of memory-matching (relative 
to mismatching) visual input in gaining conscious access, as memoranda presumably transit from VWM main-
tenance to LTM storage and back. Our paradigm allowed for VWM usage to vary, while keeping both physical 
stimulation and task-instructions equal. Here, we questioned whether the prospective reinstatement of VWM 
usage would revive the accelerated conscious access of memory-matching visual input. Our data showed that 
the advantage of memory-matching visual input in gaining conscious access is reinstated when observers plan 
to memorize a novel item imminently. This suggests that, in the anticipation of having to memorize a new item, 
the VWM machinery is reinstated, thereby incidentally reviving an activity-based VWM representation of the 
current memorandum. Taken together, our conscious perception is increasingly resilient to mnemonic influences 
as the same information is repeatedly memorized, but when we anticipate to memorize novel information immi-
nently, our conscious perception suddenly becomes vulnerable to mnemonic influences again.
Data Availability
Raw data, analysis files and experiment scripts are available here (https://osf.io/n7gpx) via the Open Science 
Framework.
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